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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
F ROM THE COLONIAL firelock to today's inexpensive handgun, the United States
has toiled over the right to keep and bear arms.' In 1981, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed this recurring
issue in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove2 The arguments espoused in Quilici
consisted of both traditional and novel hypotheses on this uncertain subject.
Delivered within an atmosphere of renewed concern over the use and possession
of firearms, the arguments in Quilici provide insight into the reasoning on both
sides of the gun-control issue.'
I. REVIEW OF THE FACTs AND RATIONAL
In Quilici, the Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, enacted a municipal
ordinance which mandated that no person may possess a handgun, unless such
handgun had been made permanently inoperative." Certain exceptions existed
in the regulation that permitted the individual ownership of functioning handguns
when their use was recreational.5 These provisions were qualified by stating
that the handgun's use and storage were limited to the premises of a licensed
gun club. 6 An action was brought by the local residents challenging the
constitutionality of this regulation. After careful review, the court held that
the gun-control ordinance did not violate either the Illinois State Constitution
or the United States Constitution.7
In reference to state constitutional considerations, Judge Decker stated
that the municipality's interest in public health and safety was a valid state police
'Numerous hypotheses have been set forth concerning whether there exists an individual right to keep
and bear arms. Although Quilici discussed many of these viewpoints, it is not a conclusive examination
of this area of the law. Instead the scope of the case is limited to those principles expressly examined
within the opinion's text. For further elaboration see generally W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND (1766); and J. Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American
Experience, 48 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 148 (1971).
1532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
'In 1980 approximately 340,000 Americans were assaulted with handguns. Add to this figure the murder
of 10,000 more persons by handguns. The Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1980, at 8. col. 1.
'532 F. Supp. at 1171. Exceptions were given to peace officers, prison officials, members of the armed
forces and national guard. VILLAGE OF MORTEN GROVE, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 132.102
(B)(2)(D)(l)(2)(3) (1981).
'Id. at § 132.102(B)(E)(7).
6id.
1Id. at 1185.
[293]
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power objective. Moreover, the statutory means of accomplishing this goal were
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and therefore, were within the realm of
the municipality's police power.' Turning its attention to possible violations
of the United States Constitution, the court next considered arguments based
on the second, fifth, and ninth amendments. However, plaintiffs failed to sustain
their contention that an individual's possession and use of firearms are personal
rights guaranteed under the above mentioned constitutional provisions.9 Hence,
the court found no merit in the plaintiffs' claims, upholding the city ordinance
as valid."0 Quilici examines considerations crucial to determining the regulation
of firearms by city and state government. The following note reviews the
potential ramifications of the decision.
A. The Second Amendment Issue
In an effort to establish the invalidity of the statute, the residents of Morton
Grove argued that the second amendment of the United States Constitution," '
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, confers on an in-
dividual the right to keep and bear arms.'" In advancing such a position, the
plaintiffs contended that the second amendment was meant to be an individual
right as opposed to a collective right.' 3 The history surrounding the creation
of the second amendment provides some insight into this inquiry. The original
draft of the provision, proposed by James Madison, reads: "The right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed but well
regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person.""' Implicit within the draft is the concept that the citizens
of the United States could prevent the potential imposition of federal govern-
ment totalitarianism upon the states because of the protection afforded by armed
state militias. The thrust of the provision was to protect the citizenry from an
all powerful central government rather than to create an individual right to keep
and bear arms. 5 Although this draft was later revised, the same pen was put
to both the original and modified versions. James Madison's own comments
illustrate support for this interpretation. 6
'Id. at 1177-79.
Vid. at 1180-85.
"Id. at 1185.
"U.S. CONST. amend. I1, states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
1532 F. Supp. at 1180.
"Id.
"1 ANNALS OF CONG. 34 (1789), construed in Weatherup, StandingArmies andArmed Citizens:An Historical
Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTING CONSTITUTIONAL L. Q., 961, 994 (1975).
"See Elliot, The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, Wis. B. BULL. May 1980, at 34. But see Cantrell, The
Right to Bear Arms: A Reply, Wis. B. BULL. Oct. 1980, at 21.
"James Madison implicitly argues this point stating:
But were the people to possess the additional advantage of local governments chosen by themselves,
who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out
[Vol. 16:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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As mentioned earlier, the intentions of the Constitutional Convention are
important in understanding the second amendment's effect upon the nation,
state, and individual. For as illustrated in Quilici, neither the acceptance nor
the rejection of the above historial analysis has eased the debate in defining
the scope of the amendment. Our Founding Fathers formulated the Constitu-
tion as a document with enough flexibility to be adaptable to the changes of
time. Over the Nation's lifetime, many of the original provisions have been
enlarged in their scope and applicability. I7 Since Marbury v. Madison, '8 the
judiciary has possessed the authority to interpret the United States' Constitu-
tion. Consequently, the second amendment's impact upon the area of gun con-
trol must be measured in accordance with prior case law.
In United States v. Cruikshank, I9 the Court laid the initial foundation for
interpreting the second amendment. In Cruikshank, a conspiracy had allegedly
occurred which deprived two black citizens of rights and privileges granted to
them as defined by the Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 187020 and secured
by the Constitution. 'In deciding whether the municipality's efforts to prevent
plaintiffs' possession and use of firearms was a violation of an individual's right,
the Court declared that the second amendment was a limitation only upon
Congress. 2' Presser v. Illinois,22 decided eleven years later, dealt with a
paramilitary association incorporated under the State of Illinois. Citing
Cruikshank, the Court reiterated the second amendment's limited scope, noting:
"[A] conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment prohibits the
legislation in question lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only
upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that
of the States." 23 The constitutional provision was viewed as being applicable
only to prevent the federal government from disarming the states, thus having
no bearing upon the states' conduct toward individuals.2 '
In 1938, United States v. Miller25 dealt with the National Firearms Act
of 193426 which, in part, required the registration of certain arms. Allegedly,
of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed
with greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned
in spite of the legions which surround it.
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 335 (J. Madison).
"Many of the amendments to the United States Constitution have been enlarged in their application to
the individual American. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment).
'15 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
992 U.S. 542 (1875).
"Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 14 (1970) current version at 18 U.S.C. §
241-45 (1977).
"192 U.S. at 553.
"116 U.S. 252 (1886).
"Id. at 265.
2"Id.
"307 U.S. 174 (1939).
2National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236-1240 (1934) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 5802
(1977).
RECENT CASESFall, 1982]
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defendant's transportation of an unregistered shotgun, with a barrel under
eighteen inches in length, violated this Act. In rejecting defendant's second
amendment argument, the Court implicitly defined the scope of the
amendment.27 It indicated that the right to bear arms exists in the collective
sense.28 This means a state is constitutionally guaranteed that its militia may
keep and bear arms. Yet the right does not attach to the individual. It is exer-
cisable solely by the state, as a collective entity, to preserve the local militia.
Further, when elaborating on this point, the Court emphasized, possibly by
mistake,29 that it is the purpose of possessing the weapon which determines
whether the second amendment is controlling:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of
a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this
time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.30
Miller, however, fails to give a satisfactory explanation of whether all arms
are sufficiently related to militia service. These gaps were the object of scrutiny
three years later in Cases v. United States. 3 Attempting to clarify the Supreme
Court's decision, the lower court concentrated on the types of arms that may
be considered to be related to militia service. Noting that, "some sort of military
use seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon," 32 the
court was forced to focus its attention on the purpose of possession, and not
on the individual, to determine when the right to bear arms attaches. To do
otherwise would, in effect, grant an across-the-board right to all Americans.
Although Cases avoided any definite guidelines, it did encourage an ad hoc
approach based upon a case-by-case evaluation of the firearm in question.33
In summary, these cases recognize the second amendment as a limitation
upon the federal government by creating a collective right in the states. As noted,
this refers to the states' right to create and maintain a militia for the purpose
of protecting their sovereignty from encroachment by the federal government.
Yet, the individual is not granted any such guarantee to keep and bear arms.
As mentioned earlier, ample justification exists for this approach. Herein is
the inadequacy of Quilici. The court relied solely on the decision in Presser
and did not discuss the collectivism line of reasoning.3"
"1307 U.S. at 178.
"Id. Citing the militia clauses of the constitution, Justice McReynolds said: "With obvious purpose to
assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee
of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view."
"Weatherup, supra note 14, at 999.
10307 U.S. at 178.
"1131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
"Id. at 922.
33d.
"532 F. Supp. at 1183-84.
[Vol. 16:2
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In Quilici, the plaintiffs' argued that the second amendment had been incor-
porated into the fourteenth amendment,35 thus making the second amendment
guarantees available to the individuals of each state. However, the court recogniz-
ed Presser as a good law stating, "the Second Amendment does not apply to
the states and localities and so is not infringed by the city ordinance."'" Through
this holding, the court limited any use of the fourteenth amendment to the more
narrow reading of the second amendment found in Cruikshank and Miller.
The Quilici decision repudiates plaintiffs' anti-gun control approach to
the second amendment without a thorough discussion of the issue. No mention
is made of an alternative reading of Presser, which suggests that the right to
bear arms be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.3 7 Commentators
supporting this view rely on the following dicta of the Court:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute
the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well
as of the States, and, in view of this prerogative of the general govern-
ment, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the
constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from
keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful
resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from
performing their duty to the general government.3"
In light of this explanation, the Court in Presser does not directly grant
an individual the right to keep and bear arms under the second amendment.
Instead, the amendment confers upon the federal government the access to a
well armed militia, beyond the national standing army.39 The militia clauses
of the Constitution authorize this federal access to the unorganized militia
existing within the states."' It is arguable that these provisions create a federal
guarantee co-existing with the states' right to organize a militia to protect against
the intrusion of the federal government by the states. Just as the states'
sovereignty is entitled to protection from the federal government, so is the federal
government afforded protection against any efforts by the states to obstruct
federal access to the local militias. Consequently, the state is limited in the regula-
tion it may impose upon the individual use and possession of arms. Otherwise,
uncontrolled local regulation could subvert the federal government's constitu-
tional guarantee to a well armed militia. Therefore, the effect of the second
amendment is to provide an individual the right to keep and bear arms.
351d.
"Id. at 1182.
"Weatherup, supra note 14, at 997.
"1116 U.S. at 265.
31d. In order to maintain the public security the federal government may draw from both the standing
national army and the state militias. This is the position of Presser.
"4U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections and repel Invasions"; art. I, § 8, cl. 18, "To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
Fall, 19821 RECENT CASES
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Judge Decker's opinion, in Quilici, rejected this second amendment argu-
ment. As noted, the court viewed the second amendment strictly as a limita-
tion on the federal government.
B. The Fifth Amendment Issue
One of the earliest limitations on the government was the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition of the public taking of private property without
compensation.41 In Quilici, plaintiffs alleged Morton Grove's gun control statute
was invalid because it constituted a taking by the city without just
compensation." The United States District Court of the Northern District of
Illinois responded in turn:
In order for a regulatory taking to require compensation, however,
the exercise of the police power must result in the destruction of the use
and enjoyment of a legitimate private property right [citation omitted].
The Morton Grove ordinance does not go that far. The geographic reach
is limited; gun owners who wish to may sell or otherwise dispose of their
handguns outside of Morton Grove. 3
The regulation at bar evoked a direct and immediate interference with the use
and value of the handguns.44 Once this concession was made, however, the court
went no further, declaring the regulation constituted a noncompensable taking. 5
A state or local government may take private property for public use under
the state's police power if it promotes public health, morals, safety, or welfare.46
This is justified as a reasonable exercise of police power. But, as Quilici
demonstrates, some takings require compensation while others do not.4 7 This
is important since Morton Grove's taking was not compensated, and therefore,
would be invalid if deemed to be a taking requiring compensation. Justice
Brennan's remarks in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City48
illustrate the underlying rationale for the Quilici court's adjudication that the
statutory taking was noncompensable. "The restrictions imposed are substan-
tially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit
reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants [the
owners] opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but
"U.S. CONST. amend. V reads in part: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." This restriction is applicable only for limiting other constitutional provisions which authorize
the taking of private property for public use. It is not an authorization, in itself, for such taking.
"'532 F. Supp. at 1183-84.
43Id.
"Id. at 1185-88. The purpose of the municipal regulation was to place a burden upon the use and possession
of handguns. This is obvious from the statute's language. Therein, an individual was severely limited in
the use and possession of a handgun.
"4Id. at 1183-84.
"See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
"National Board of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969); But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
4438 U.S. 104 (1978).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
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also other properties." 9 Moreover, the interference with an owner's property
does not constitute a compensable exercise of the local government's police
power if it allows the owner to make some reasonable use of his property."
Relying upon the statute's named exception,5 ' the court in Quilici held that the
burden imposed upon the plaintiffs did not prohibit a reasonable use of the
handguns." Consequently, no compensation was due to the handgun owner.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co. reveals the
conflict existing between compensated and noncompensated takings. "It is
exactly this imposition of general costs on a few individuals at which the 'taking'
protection is directed .... [A] taking does not become a noncompensable exercise
of police power simply because the government in its grace allows the owner
to make some 'reasonable' use of his property." 53 Seemingly, Jusitce Rehnquist
would require compensation in takings where any burden has been placed on
the property. This conflict between Justice Brennan's and Justice Rehnquist's
positions has been reiterated in other fifth amendment cases.5 ' Quilici does
not adequately refute Rehnquist's position, rather it merely concentrates upon
bolstering the Brennan approach. The text of the Quilici opinion fails to show
the court acknowledged the existence of the Rehnquist line of reasoning. This
conclusion is inappropriate in lieu of the division of authority in fifth amend-
ment cases over the Brennan and Rehnquist positions.5
C. The Ninth Amendment Issue
Utilizing an ad hoc approach, the judiciary, by way of the fourteenth
amendment, has made certain guarantees found within the first ten amend-
ments of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states.56 Plaintiffs,
in Quilici, argued that there exists an unenumerated right to self-defense which
was recognized by the likes of Aristotle, Cicero and John Locke.57 Plaintiffs
argued that the right to hold arms for the purpose of self-defense is such a
fundamental right protected by the ninth amendment."
4Id. at 138.
"Id. at 137.
"VILLAGE OF MORTEN GROVE, ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 132.102(E)(7), provides in part that handguns
may be used at "[Ilicensed gun clubs provided the given club ... maintains possession and control of
handguns used by its members and has procedures and facilities for keeping such handguns in a same
place ... "
"Id. at 1184. Allegedly the carved out exceptions within the statute, in addition to its limited geographical
reach, provide the affected handgun owner with enough alternatives as to allow the reasonable use and
possession of the firearm.
"1438 U.S. at 147, 149.
1"The question of when a taking requires compensation has appeared before the United States Supreme
Court in many areas. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), low flying aircraft; United
States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952), wartime distruction of private property. For general comments see
J. CosTONIS, C. BERGER & S. SCOTT, REGULATION V. COMPENSATION IN LAND USE CONTROL: A RECOMMENDED
ACCOMMODATION, A CRITIQUE, AND AN INTERPRETATION (1977).
"See supra note 54.
"Cantrell, supra note 15, at 26.
"532 F. Supp. at 1183.
"Id. U.S. CONST. amend. IX, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Fall, 1982] RECENT CASES
7
Benedic: Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Within its opinion, the Quilici court set forth a commentary delineating
the weaknesses present in a ninth amendment argument to prohibit gun con-
trol. However, the court's rejection of the ninth amendment rationale was
premature since the underlying reasons were not fully considered.
Submitting to Griswold v. Connecticut," Judge Decker cited the opinion
of the Court as delivered by Justice Douglas. Therein, the text reads: "[T]hat
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. 60 Quite con-
vincingly, Quilici proclaims that the "penumbras" and "emanations" arising
from the ninth amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights, have
manifested themselves solely in the areas of family and procreation. 61 Apart
from these classifications, no other allegedly unenumerated rights have endured
judicial scrutiny. 62 Clearly, if premised upon Justice Douglas' approach, the
alleged unenumerated right to self-defense would be found deficient. Yet, in
merely considering Douglas' opinion alone, the authority for the court's rationale
totters.63
Little mention is made of Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold" in which he, along with Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan,
posited the ninth amendment as proof of certain fundamental rights existing
outside of the first ten amendments to the Constitution. Goldberg's approach
did not limit these guarantees to being within the "penumbras" of the first
eight amendments, but he also alluded to separate and distinct rights:
Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors
that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first
eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not
be deemed exhaustive.... [T]his Court has held, often unanimously, that
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments protect certain fundamental per-
sonal liberties .... The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of
the Constitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights should
not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply
because they are not specifically listed in the first eight Constitutional
amendments.65
Furthermore, the court "[m]ust look to the 'traditions and collective conscience
"381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"Id. at 484. It should be noted that Justice Douglas' opinion did not represent a majority of the Court.
Rather it was one of several opinions offered by the Justices.
"532 F. Supp. at 1183. See also J. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HAR. L. REV.
5 (1978).
62See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630 (10th ed. 1980).
"1532 F. Supp. at 1183-84. The Quilici opinion sets forth its particular interpretation of the fifth amendment
but fails to elaborate on its reasons for rejecting plaintiffs' viewpoint. The court uses this dismissal by
substitution when it rejected plaintiffs' ninth amendment argument.
1"381 U.S. at 486.
"Id. at 492.
[Vol. 16:2
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of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted there as to be
ranked as fundamental.' "66 Citing several famous natural law philosophers,
in addition to certain English common law cases, plaintiffs endeavored to reveal
the concept of possessing arms for defense of person and home as an accepted
guarantee in the lives of our ancestors.6 7 Hence, it may be argued that the right
to bear and possess arms for individual use may be deemed to be so rooted
within the traditions and the collective conscious of our people as to be ranked
fundamental to the ordered liberty of our society. This would connote the ex-
istence of an unenumerated individual right to arms. Such an argument may
potentially become a strong argument against gun control. Surely, it is an argu-
ment which merits future consideration by the judiciary.
D. The State Constitutional Issue
Quilici's judicial edict concerning whether the statute was a valid state police
power has less precedential value than the federal constitutional issues previously
discussed. By its very nature, the court's ascertations are limited to the boun-
daries of the State of Illinois. Consequently, its pronouncement is likely to be
of value only as a point of reference in cases beyond the State's jurisdiction.
Succinctly, the decision viewed the gun control regulation as being based
upon the valid state objective of public health and safety. Reviewing the means
used to accomplish this goal, the court stated that the regulation was a reasonable
exercise of police power being "neither arbitrary nor simplistic." The judg-
ment was founded upon a historical review of article I, section 22 of the Illinois
Constitution.68
II. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing illustrates, Quilici's precendential value is twofold. It serves
to further the pro-gun control positions found in Cruikshank, Presser, and
Miller. Yet, at the same time, plaintiffs' fifth, ninth, and modified second amend-
ment arguments provide arguments for the anti-gun position. Though Quilici
upholds governmental gun control, the opinion is somewhat ambiguous in its
rejection of plaintiff's proposals. Hence there is opportunity for the anti-gun
control advocate to reintroduce the issues in upcoming litigation.
MARK BENEDICT
66Id. at 493.
6'532 F. Supp. at 1183.
"ILL. CONST. art I, § 22, provides: "Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
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